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th Finance Commission has forayed into a number of areas partly 
warranted by its terms of reference and partly due to the approach it adopted.  The 
Commission, besides tax devolution, has recommended as many as 12 different 
types of grants with a plethora of conditionalities. A critical appraisal of the 
recommendations shows that the transfer system recommended by the Commissions 
suffers from the same limitations of inequity and perverse incentives as in the past.   
 
  The inability to offset the fiscal disabilities of the states leads to giving several 
grants.  Even here, the approach is ad hoc.  In particular, the grants recommended 
for individual states for their special needs is a classic example of ad hoc approach 
which is arbitrary and judgemental.   The recommendations relating to the GST are 
the ones which have been resented most by the states and actually, this has taken 
the reform agenda backwards.  The “all or nothing” types of conditions do not leave 
much room for a “grand bargain”.   
 
  A major concern is with a plethora of conditionalities imposed by the 
Commission.  Besides the conditions on GST compensations discussed above, there 
are several conditions stipulated for achieving fiscal consolidation and incentivising 
local bodies.  There are questions on design, implementation, and monitoring of 
these conditions.  These questions leave one suspect that the Commission lost an 
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The report of the 13
th Finance Commission, is perhaps more comprehensive 
than any other report in its analysis of fiscal developments in the country and 
recommendations on issues not only relevant to intergovernmental finance, but also a 
variety of issues relating to fiscal management by central and state governments.  
The matters dealt with include fiscal consolidation, disaster relief, design and 
implementation of goods and services tax (GST), local government reform, education, 
environmental protection, and specific problems affecting individual states.  It has 
broken the past record by making as many as 12 different types of grants.   There are 
5 subcategories of grants for improving outcomes alone and two environment related 
grants.  Thus, besides the usual tax devolution and grants given to fill non-plan 
budgetary gaps, grants have been recommended for disaster relief and local bodies, 
performance incentive grants for three special category states (Assam, Sikkim and 
Uttarakhand), grants for elementary education to states equivalent to 15 per cent of 
the Sarva Shikha Abhiyan (SSA) expenditures, grants to compensate the states for 
any loss of revenue arising from GST reform, grants for reduction in infant mortality 
rate, environment related grants for forest development, renewable energy and water 
sector management, incentive grants for improving outcomes in five different areas, 
separate grants for road maintenance, and state specific grants to meet their special 
needs.  Thus, the scope of coverage by the Commission is much wider than the past.  
In the process, it has loaded the centre and even more, the states with a plethora of 
conditionalities to micro-manage their fiscal systems. 
 
  However, unlike the past, by and large, the reaction to the Report of the 
Commission has been muted.  There is hardly any detailed analysis of the main 
recommendations either by the states or by independent researchers and that is 
really surprising.  In part, this may be due to the fact that state finances are in a much 
better shape today than the time when either the 11
th or 12
th Finance Commissions 
submitted their reports.  Of course, some states have expressed unhappiness with 
the way the detailed conditionalities have been prescribed.  Even more, they were 
dissatisfied with the way the recommendations relating to the GST have been made.  
On the main recommendations relating to tax devolution and gap grants, however, 
there has not been much discussion. 
 
  The focus of this paper is to examine the approach of the Commission in 
regard to its ToR and analyse the recommendations relating to its main task, namely 
tax devolution and grants and analyse the conditionalities. Detailed analysis of other 
recommendations have not been gone into in this paper mainly because, many of the 
grants recommended are not warranted by the ToR per se, and there is no need to 
go into the merit or otherwise of these grants.  The important point is that in 
recommending 12 different types of grants with a variety of conditionalities attached, 
the Commission simply fragmented the transfer system. Section 2 analyses the 
general approach of the Commission in regard to the ToRs and summarises the 




the introduction of GST.  This section also examines the recommendations in regard 
to the substantive Terms of Reference (ToRs) relating to tax devolution and grants-in-
aid.  In particular, it examines the new innovation of the Commission in bringing in the 
fiscal capacity distance factor in tax devolution in the place of per capita income.   
Section 3 analyses the conditionalities and their usefulness and efficacy.  The last 
section makes a few concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Approach of the Commission 
 
 
  In terms of total resources transferred, the Commission’s recommendations 
are supposed to result in a marginal increase in the transfers.  According to the 
Commission’s estimates, the aggregate transfers (tax devolution and grants) 
recommended by the Commission works out to 32.2  per cent of total revenues of the 
central government or  close to 4 per cent of the estimated GDP.  The Commission’s 
recommendations were guided by the desire to maintain the long-term stability in the 
relative shares of the centre and states in total revenues and therefore, it set the 
indicative target for transfers from all sources at 39.5 per cent which is marginally 
higher than 38 per cent set by the previous Commission.  Thus, the overall transfers 
to the states are determined on the basis of the Commission’s judgement that the 
relative shares of the centre and states in total revenues, and expenditures should 
remain stable and not on any objective consideration of their resources or 
requirements.   The fact is the recommendations will neither result in the keeping the 
relative shares of the centre and states in total revenues and expenditures constant 
nor is there any economic rationale to state that such a goal is desirable.   
Furthermore, there is nothing that prevents the central government from introducing 
more centrally sponsored schemes involving sizeable expenditures and exceed the 
limit set.  With the central government raking up huge revenues from sources like 
telecom auction of which the states do not get any share, the relative share of the 
states is likely to go down sharply.  The goal itself is misconceived because, income 
elasticity of demand for different expenditures is different and generally, the 
expenditure requirements under the state list like education and healthcare are likely 
to increase at a much faster rate than defence and administration.   Of course, in the 
Commission’s defence, it must be stated that unlike the past Commissions, this 
Commission at least made their assumptions explicit.   
 
(a)  Tax Devolution and Gap Grants 
 
The approach followed by the Commission to deal with the first two terms 
under  Article 280 relating to tax devolution under Article 270 and fiscal disability 
grants under Article 275 grants is not different from the past.  The past Commissions 
were criticised for making recommendations not on the basis of estimated fiscal 
capacities and needs of the states, but based on the projections made on the base 
year actual revenues and non-plan revenue expenditures.  Two basic shortcomings 
of the approach pointed out are, “the tyranny of the base year” and “fiscal dentistry”.  
The Commission, like the past Commissions ‘sanitises’ the base year estimates and 
applies some norms and judgements to make projections on them rather than 
estimating fiscal capacities and needs of the states for determining the transfers.     
After making tax devolution based on certain independent factors (of course, related 
to capacity and need), the gap between non-plan revenue expenditures and post 




Thus, the overall transfer to the states with post devolution gaps is determined by the 
‘cavities’ between projected non-plan revenue expenditures and states’ post 
devolution revenue receipts.  The perverse incentives arising from this approach is 
widely discussed in the literature and there is no need to dwell on this in detail (Rao 
and Singh, 2005; Rao, 2009).  Interestingly, although the ToR do not make the 
distinction between plan and non-plan requirements and even as there is widespread 
recognition of the unscientific nature of the distinction and the distortions they create, 
the Commission chose to confine its basic recommendations to cover the gap 
between post-devolution revenues and non-plan revenue expenditures. Perhaps, it is 
too much to expect the Finance Commissions from deviating from the past. 
 
On determining the proportion of tax devolution and grants too, the approach 
of the Finance Commissions generally has not been based on any objective 
considerations but on the basis of judgements and 13
th Finance Commission is no 
exception.  It has merely tinkered with the overall share of the states at the margin.  
The states’ share in central taxes has been increased from 30.5 per cent (including 
the share of additional excise duties) to 32 per cent.  The states can also levy sales 
tax/VAT on additional excise duty items.  In addition, as mentioned above, 12 
different types of grants were recommended. 
 
On the distribution of the shares of the states inter-se, the Commission has 
assigned the same weights to population and area as the previous Commission. An 
important innovation of the Commission is in replacing the distance from the highest 
per capita income with the distance from the highest per capita fiscal capacity 
distance.  Unlike the past Commissions, instead of estimating the entitlements based 
on the distance from the highest per capita income, the Commission takes the 
distance from the highest per capita ‘fiscal capacity’ and gives 47.5 per cent weights 
to the factor.  The Commission has estimated the average tax-GSDP ratios 
separately for general category states and special category states for the period, 
2004-07, and estimated ‘per capita taxable capacity’ for each state by multiplying the 
group’s average ratio with the GSDP of the state.  It has then estimated per capita 
taxable capacity for each state and the distance from the highest fiscal capacity is 
estimated.  The distance multiplied by the population of the state divided by the 
summation of this variable for all the states gives the shares of individual states. 
 
There are both conceptual and methodological problems with this approach.  
There are both conceptual and methodological problems with this approach and 
these are discussed in the next section. This also has significant implications for inter-
state distribution of tax devolution and Finance Commission transfers in the case of 
the states with no post-devolution gaps.  If the Commission thought that by taking 
fiscal capacity rather than per capita incomes, it has avoided the disincentives arising 
from the ‘gap-filling’ approach, it is sadly mistaken.  The controlling total for basic 
transfers still continues to be the gaps between projected non-plan expenditures and 
own revenues of the states.  Thus, from the viewpoint of both equity and incentives, 
the Commission’s approach is not different from the past. 
 
  The Commission gives two reasons for taking this measure.  The first is that 
the single average applied to GSDP for both general category and special category 
states does not actually capture the fiscal distance between the two groups because 
sectoral composition of GSDP varies between the two groups.  The states with higher 
share of agricultural incomes, for example, are supposed to have lower taxable 
capacity.   Second, the measure of GSDP is in factor cost and it does not include net 




general category states is much higher than in special category states.  For these 
reasons separate averages for general and special category states have been taken 
as norms. 
 
Unfortunately, the argument is not convincing. States’ revenue collections 
accrue mainly from consumption taxes and there is nothing to show that sectoral 
composition should make any difference.  Of course, it is difficult to levy taxes on 
consumption by unorganised sectors (including self consumption by producing 
households).  Furthermore, the share of agricultural incomes in special category 
states is not more than the general category states.  In fact, overwhelming proportion 
of income in special category states is from public administration and not agriculture.  
Of course, the tax -GSDP ratios in these states is low not because their taxable 
capacity is less but they simply do not put in comparable effort to raise tax revenues.    
As far as the second argument is concerned, it is true that GSDP as an indicator of 
fiscal capacity is flawed, but the Commission uses the same measure to estimate the 
tax-GSDP ratio which also excludes the net income from outside the state! 
 
It is not the contention here that the special category states do not deserve a 
special treatment.  Surely, the argument for differential treatment should come from 
cost disabilities in these states as the remoteness of the states and high 
transportation costs of goods, large proportion of forest area and difficult terrain 
significantly increases the unit cost of providing public services which, surely, should 
be taken account of.   In any case, the reasons given in the report do not provide 
enough reason for substituting the per capita income difference with the so called 
‘fiscal capacity’ distance measure. 
 
 On a closer look, adoption of the new measure is retrograde in some ways.  
The implicit assumption of the past Commissions in estimating the distance from the 
highest per capita income was that per capita income is the sole determinant of fiscal 
capacity.  At higher levels of per capita incomes, the capacity is assumed to be 
disproportionately higher as indicated by the distance from the highest per capita 
income.   The 13
th Commission while taking average tax/GSDP ratio also assumes 
that per capita income is the sole determinant of taxable capacity and taking average 
for the group (general category and special category) assumes the relationship to be 
proportional.  Of course, in order to make the distribution progressive, the 
Commission took the distance from the highest capacity in determining the relative 
shares of the states.   Thus, conceptually there is superiority of the so called ‘fiscal 
capacity’ index over per capita income when you assume that the tax-GSDP ratios 
should be the average irrespective of the level of per capita income of the state 
(within each group). At the same time, this has significant implications for 
progressivity in the inter-se distribution of tax devolution to the states. 
 
The fact of the matter is that tax-GSDP has a significant and positive 
relationship with per capita incomes in general category states and this cannot be 
entirely attributed to variations in tax efforts.  There are logical reasons for expecting 
lower tax-GSDP ratios in states with lower per capita incomes.  The main reason is 
that the states with lower per capita incomes have much higher proportion of 
unorganised sector transactions and non-market consumption and these can not be 
captured by any tax administration and, therefore, cannot constitute the potential tax 
base.  Secondly, thus far, due to the levy of Central Sales Tax, the sales tax has 
been predominantly origin based which implies that the richer producing states could 




the average tax – GSDP as the norm for determining taxable capacity surely tends to 
bias the distribution against the poorer states. 
 
We have tried to estimate the relationship between tax-GSDP ratio and per 
capita incomes of the states and the result presented below shows a significant 
relationship between tax-GSDP ratios with per capita GSDP.  The estimated log-
linear regressions show that the coefficient of per capita income on tax-GSDP ratio is 
positive and significant, while the coefficient of non-agriculture GSDP is not significant.  
Thus, the sectoral composition of income does not seem to have a significant impact 
in determining the tax ratio whereas the states with higher per capita incomes have 
higher tax ratios. 
 
Ln (T/Y) =   - 2.4848  +  0.2863* Ln (Y/P) +  0.3595 Ln (Ynag/Y) 
         (-1.0395)   (1.9914)                  (0.5165) 
R
2 = 0.4060   F= 4.44 
 
(Significant at 5 per cent level) 
 
Where T = Tax revenue of the state, Y= GSDP of the state, P= Population of the state,  
 
 Ynag = per cent GSDP from non-agricultural sectors 
 
Canada is one of the countries that employs the estimates of fiscal capacity 
for determining equalisation payments. They it identifies as many as 33 revenue 
sources of the provinces and estimates revenue capacity using the representative tax 
system approach.  In this, after quantifying each of the revenue bases of the 
provinces, the average effective rate of each source is worked out.   Applying the 
average effective rate on the actual revenue base yields the revenue capacity from 
the source.  By summing up the potential for all the revenue sources, the total fiscal 
capacity of a province is arrived at.  The provinces with lower than average revenue 
capacity are given equalisation payments to bring them up to the average level so 
that each province is enabled to provide comparable levels of public services at 
comparable tax rates.   Interestingly, the provincial fiscal base also include revenues 
from oil and with sharp increase in oil prices, Alberta which has sizeable oil revenues 
distorted the estimates and even a relatively affluent province like Ontario would have 
become eligible to receive equalisation payments.  Therefore, the formula was 
revised to include only half of revenues from oil in estimating revenue capacity. 
 
Australia employs both fiscal capacity and needs in computing the 
‘relativities’ of the states on the basis of which equalisation grants are given.  Here 
again, the fiscal capacity is estimated using the representative tax system approach 
for each of the taxes levied by the provinces and this is added to arrive at the 
aggregate capacity.  The Commonwealth Grants Commission compiles information 
on each of the taxes for individual provinces and makes the computations available to 
the states. 
 
Unlike these countries, the fiscal capacity is only one of the factors used in 
the devolution formula and the overall transfers are determined by the projected gap 
between revenues and non-plan revenue expenditures.  Nevertheless, the 
Commission could have done well to use a better measure of fiscal capacity rather 





Finally, like the previous two Commissions, the 13
th Finance Commission 
uses fiscal discipline as one of the factors to determine the share of individual states 
in tax devolution and assign 7.5 per cent weight to this factor.  This is measured as 
the improvement in the ratio of own revenues to revenue expenditures of the state 
divided by all state average ratio of own revenues to revenue expenditures.  The 
simple point is if the previous Finance Commission’s recommendations result in 
higher transfers to a state, its revenue expenditure would increase and ratio of own 
revenue to expenditure will decline.  This would show the state as less disciplined! 
 
A comparison of the relative shares of individual states in tax devolution 
(excluding the service tax shares) is shown in Table 1.  In order to provide 
comparable estimates for the identical period, the 12
th Finance Commission formula 
was applied to the data used by the 13th Finance Commission.  It is seen that the 
biggest losers due to change in the devolution formula are the poorest states of Bihar, 
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. 
 
(b)  Grants-in-aid to States 
 
  Generally, equalising transfers are supposed to offset the fiscal disabilities of 
the states arising from lower revenue capacity and higher unit cost of providing public 
services.  The objective is to enable the states to provide comparable levels of 
services at comparable tax rates.  The approach of the 13
th Finance Commission, like 
its predecessors, has not permitted it to adopt such an approach and the continuation 
of the gap-filling approach, as already pointed out has impacted on both equity and 
incentives.  In fact, inability of the Commissions to offset relative fiscal disabilities of 
the states necessitated the Commission to recommend a large number of specific 
purpose grants.  A more holistic approach to offset disabilities would have obviated 
the need for many of the specific purpose recommended. 
 
  This is not to say that there is no place for specific purpose transfers.  Indeed, 
some specific purpose transfers are necessary to ensure minimum standards of 
services in respect of important services which are considered meritorious.  However, 
many of the grants recommended by the Commission, particularly those given for 
specific requirements do not fall into this category.  Giving grants to the states for 
their “special needs” for example, gives an appearance of being arbitrary and 
judgemental.  I shall not be surprised if the states come up with a plethora of their 
special needs when the next Commission starts functioning. 
 
One of the important features of the 13
th Finance Commission’s approach is 
giving as many as 12 different purposes.  As mentioned earlier, grants are 
recommended for a variety of purposes.  In the process, the Commission wanted to 
achieve besides its own core objectives, several objectives that should have required 
separate commissions on matters such as macroeconomic management, GST reform, 
expenditure reforms, and ecology and environment.  It is certainly not to doubt the 
eminence of the people in the Commission or their capacity to deal with each of these 
issues, but simply that giving as many as 12 different types of grants has only 
resulted in fragmenting the already disjointed system of intergovernmental transfers 
and created a plethora of conditions to the centre and states.   
 
Did the ToR require the Commission to make so many grants?   Apart from 
tax devolution, grants and augmenting the consolidated fund of the states to 
supplement the resources of local bodies, the ToR simply requires the Commission to 




commitments of the central government, resources of the state governments and the 
need to generate revenue surpluses for capital investment, tax efforts of central and 
state governments and the need for additional resource mobilisation, the impact of 
the proposed GST, need to improve the quality of expenditures to obtain better 
outputs and outcomes, the need to manage the ecology, environment, and climate 
change for sustainable development, the need to ensure commercial viability of 
irrigation and power projects, departmental undertakings and non-departmental 
enterprises through various means including the levy of user charges and measures 
to promote efficiency and the norms for the non-wage component for the 
maintenance and upkeep of capital assets and the non-wage related maintenance 
expenditure on plan schemes on the basis of which specific amounts are to be 
recommended.  Except in the case of maintenance expenditures, the ToR does not 
require the Commission to recommend grants.  Of course, there is nothing that 
prevents the Commission from recommending grants for various purposes, but as 
mentioned earlier, a holistic approach to determining the transfers would have 
obviated the need for fragmenting the transfer system and imposing so many 
conditions which will make monitoring them a daunting task.    
 




  Shares of states in tax devolution 
(including service tax) 
 12
th FC  13
th FC  Difference 
Shares re-estimated 
using 12
th FC formula 
for 13




7.362 6.948  -0.414  7.089 6.937  -0.152 
Bihar 11.037  10.934  -0.103  11.407 10.917  -0.490 
Chhattisgarh 2.656  2.474  -0.182  2.520 2.470  -0.050 
Goa  0.259  0.266  0.007 0.256 0.266 0.010 
Gujarat 3.572  3.046  -0.526  2.960 3.041 0.081 
Haryana 1.076  1.050  -0.026  1.015 1.048 0.033 
Jharkhand 3.364  2.806  -0.557  2.851 2.802  -0.049 
Karnataka 4.463  4.335  -0.128  4.470 4.328  -0.142 
Kerala 2.667  2.345  -0.322  2.379 2.341  -0.038 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
6.717  7.131  0.415 7.360 7.120  -0.240 
Maharastra  5.001  5.207  0.206 4.886 5.199 0.313 
Orissa 5.165  4.787  -0.379  4.780 4.779  -0.001 
Punjab  1.300  1.391  0.091 1.368 1.389 0.021 
Rajasthan  5.614  5.862  0.249 5.973 5.853  -0.120 
Tamil Nadu  5.309  4.977  -0.333  5.103 4.969  -0.134 
Uttar  Pradesh  19.280  19.708  0.428 20.211 19.677  -0.534 
General. Cat. 
States  
84.842  83.267  -1.574 84.628 83.136  -1.492 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
0.288  0.328  0.040 0.297 0.328 0.031 
Assam  3.238  3.634  0.396 3.126 3.628 0.502 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
0.522  0.782  0.260 0.487 0.781 0.294 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
1.214  1.394  0.180 1.370 1.551 0.181 
Manipur  0.362  0.452  0.089 0.398 0.451 0.053 
Meghalaya  0.371  0.409  0.037 0.359 0.408 0.049 
Mizoram  0.239  0.269  0.030 0.247 0.269 0.022 
Nagaland  0.263  0.314  0.051 0.287 0.314 0.027 










  Shares of states in tax devolution 
(including service tax) 
 12
th FC  13
th FC  Difference 
Shares re-estimated 
using 12
th FC formula 
for 13
th FC data 
Difference 
Tripura  0.428  0.512  0.083 0.432 0.511 0.079 
Uttaranchal  0.940  1.122  0.182 0.918 1.120 0.202 
West  Bengal  7.063  7.276  0.213 7.222 7.264 0.042 
Special. Cat. 
States 
15.155  16.731  1.573 15.371 16.864  1.493 
Total 100.000  100.000  0.000  100.000 100.000  0.000 
Note: Excludes the share of service tax.   
 
 
(c)   Approach to GST Reform 
 
There is considerable unease on the treatment of ToR relating to GST.  Note 
that the ToR requires the Commission to take into account the impact of the proposed 
implementation of GST and not work out the modalities to deal with the reform itself.  
Instead, the Commission went about detailing the outline of “the model GST” – with 
features such as minimum exemptions, a single rate of tax on all goods and services 
uniformly levied across states, zero-rating of exports, and ensuring destination based 
tax to ensure seamless trade across the country.  It also recommended the “grand 
bargain” to be conducted between the centre and states’ with six elements namely, 
the design of GST to evolve the model GST, operational modalities, binding 
agreement between the centre and states with contingencies for changing rates and 
procedures, implementation schedule, disincentives for non-compliance and the 
procedure to claim compensation.  It recommended a compensation package of Rs. 
50,000 crore, for any loss of revenue and if all elements of the grand bargain are not 
satisfied the compensation will not be payable. 
 
Any desirable tax reform should minimise the cost of compliance as well as 
the distortion cost while not increasing the cost of collection (Bird and Zolt, 2004) and 
GST reform is expected to minimise all the three costs though, the claim made by the 
NCAER study that the levy will result in a gain in an estimated GDP increase in 
present value terms between Rs. 14.69 crore and Rs. 28.81 crore seems to be much 
too exaggerated.  Although the detailed methodology of the study is not available 
even in the NCAER study report, the very fact that the study is based on 2003-04 
input- output table indicates that the productivity gains since 2003-04 including those 
arising from the introduction of VAT replacing the cascading type sales tax has not 
been taken into account.  In any case, with the type of shortcomings in the quality of 
data, to place faith in such estimates demands a leap of faith.  This is not to state that 
the reform is not important.  Surely, this will not be a “game changer” as the 13
th 
Finance Commission believes.  In fact, the introduction of VAT was a game changer 
and the GST reform should be seen as only the next step in the reform process. 
 
The point is that tax reform is a process and not an event and if the design 
aspects are not negotiable in the “grand bargain”, it is doubtful whether the reform 
can go further at all.  Even more retrograde was the estimate of revenue neutral rates 
made by the GST task force.  There are several problems with these estimates and to 
take four different estimates and taking an average shows that the task force itself 




While everyone desires that the rate of tax should be low, to show highly 
underestimated rate as revenue neutral as the task force did force the states to adopt 
extreme positions.  Not only that the revenue neutral rate estimated by the task force 
is way too below what the states think, but there are wide variations in the revenue 
neutral rates across states.  Thus, even if the central government gives compensation 
for three years, if there is a permanent decline in the revenues, the states with high 
revenue neutral rates fear loss of revenue. 
 
It is important to note that the consumption tax reform involving the central 
and state governments will have to make a compromise between tax uniformity and 
fiscal autonomy.  While the aim should be to get the fundamentals of the reform right, 
compromise is unavoidable and the solution may have to settle at less than the best 
from the point of view of tax uniformity but allows some measure of fiscal autonomy.  
To state that the “GST grant compensates for the seeming limitation in fiscal 
autonomy by enhancing expenditure autonomy through compensation payments and 
additional formulaic transfers” (p. 71), is to misunderstand the concept of fiscal 
autonomy altogether.  First, compensation is given against the loss of revenues and 
not a bribe for adopting the GST reform.  Second, fiscal autonomy under fiscal 
decentralisation means manoeuvrability to change standards of public services by 
changing tax rates and not simply softening the budget constraint to spend more 
money. 
 
Indeed, the ideal design should be the goal, but in many states the socio-
political considerations may not allow them to adopt uniform minimum exemptions 
and a single uniform rate.  In fact, even as economists recommended moving over to 
a single rate of VAT in Sweden recently, the government found it impossible to 
change over to a single rate.  Everyone knows that equity is better served by better 
targeting expenditures and not by having high and multiple rates and yet, political 
perceptions are hard to change.  Bird and Gendron (2007, p. 13) show that in 
European Union the standard rate of VAT varied from 15 to 25 per cent with a mean 
of 19.4 per cent and except for Denmark, every other European country has one or 
more rates in addition to the standard rates.  It is not to argue that having multiple 
rates is desirable and surely, every effort should be made to minimise rate 
differentiation from the viewpoint of reducing the collection cost, compliance cost to 
the taxpayers and distortions in the economy.  But these are political decisions and 
compromises are unavoidable.  The Commission’s approach of insisting on “all or 
nothing” rules out compromises altogether. 
 
(d)   Roadmap for Fiscal Consolidation 
 
The revised road map for fiscal consolidation charted by the Commission is, 
in many ways, a continuation to the map laid down by the 12
th Finance Commission.  
The fiscal deficit target is set to be consistent with the targeted debt to GDP ratio.  
The consolidated Debt to GDP ratio is targeted to decline from 78.8 per cent in 2009-
10 to 67.8 per cent in 2014-15.  In consistence with this, the fiscal deficit is supposed 
to be reduced from 9.5 per cent to 5.4 per cent during the period.  The central 
government is required to reduce its outstanding debt to GDP ratio from 54.2 per cent 
in 2009-10 to 44.8 per cent in 2014-15 and its fiscal deficit target is to reduce it from 
6.8 per cent to 3 per cent and revenue deficit from 4.8 per cent to a surplus of 0.5 per 
cent during the period. 
 
Has the fiscal restructuring recommended by the 12
th Finance Commission 




fiscal and revenue deficits at both central and state levels until 2008-09 when various 
fiscal developments in the year resulted in the deficits going out of control.  I have 
argued elsewhere (Rao, 2009a) that the significant improvement in the fiscal situation 
in the country since 2003-04 was not due to legislated discipline but due mainly to 
sharp increase in the income tax revenues arising from the buoyancy of the economy 
and even more, introduction of tax information network (TIN).  In fact, increase in 
revenues from income tax between 2003-04 and 2007-08 was almost three 
percentage points to GDP, although this helped the central government to achieve 
the revenue increase targets as set out by the FRBMA task force.  At the same time, 
the task force had indicated the compression of revenue expenditures by two 
percentage points and the only component of revenue expenditure compressed was 
interest payments which declined because of debt swap and lower interest rates.  In 
the case of the states, the improvement was caused by higher tax devolution arising 
from the buoyancy of central taxes, particularly the income taxes as well as larger 
central transfers to states.  On the expenditure side, the rescheduling and writing off 
of states’ debt by the 12
th Finance Commission and lower interest rates reduced their 
interest payments.  Of course, states’ own tax revenues too increased as a share of 
GSDP due to the buoyancy of the economy and the associated increase in taxable 
consumption.  At the same time, there was virtually no compression in non-interest 
expenditures. 
 
Equally important point to note is that the sharp upsurge in the deficits in 
2008-09 was mainly due to central government’s decision to spend more on pay 
revision, increased subsidies, expansion in the scope of National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act and introduction of loan waiver scheme and not due to the stimulus 
package given to meet the global economic crisis.  This is not to say that these 
measures did not provide the stimulus.  They certainly did, but along with the election 
related expenditures, its amount is very difficult to quantify.  In fact, increased 
spending on these items even before the crisis helped in soft landing the economy.  
But the structural issues relating to the fiscal imbalances in the centre as well as in 
the states have not been addressed and the consolidation will have to start all over 
again.  Indeed, the fiscal responsibility legislations did not inculcate the culture of 
fiscal austerity and the entire exercise was reduced to a routine. 
 
The 13
th Finance Commission has recommended the revised roadmap for 
fiscal consolidation and in order to impart effectiveness to the process, it has made a 
series of recommendations to make the FRBM process (i) transparent and 
comprehensive; (ii) sensitive to countercyclical changes; and (iii) institute a system to 
effectively monitor the compliance.  The measures to make the system 
comprehensive and transparent include preparation of a more detailed medium term 
fiscal plan (MTFP) to put forward detailed estimates of revenues and expenditures 
and to make it a statement of “commitment” rather than merely one of “intent”.  It has 
recommended a number of micro measures such as putting forward the economic 
and functional classification of expenditures as a part of MTFP, preparing the detailed 
statement on central transfers to states, reporting compliance costs on the major tax 
proposals, presenting the revenue consequences of capital expenditures, fiscal fallout 
of PPPs, preparation of an inventory of vacant land and buildings valued at market 
prices by all departments and enterprises (see,  Table 2).  The Commission has 
recommended that the values of parameters underlying the projection of revenues 
and expenditures in the MTFP should be made explicit and the band within which the 
parameters can vary when there are exogenous shocks while remaining within the 
FRBM targets.  It has also recommended that the nature of shocks warranting the 




in terms of larger devolution rather than increased borrowing limits and the centre 
should meet this additional cost.  Most importantly, the Commission has 
recommended the setting up of a committee which will eventually transform into a 
fiscal council to conduct an annual independent public review and monitoring of the 
FRBM process.  The Council should be an autonomous body reporting to the Ministry 
of Finance, which in turn should report to the Parliament on matters dealt with by the 
Council. 
 
Many of the recommendations are important, but the question is whether the 
Commission has gone beyond its mandate to micro manage the process.  In fact, 
some of the recommendations such as keeping the inventory of land and buildings 
are important to ensure the comprehensiveness of the budget but may not be feasible 
for the immediate implementation of the FRBM.  For the present, it should be enough 
to make both the centre and states to get a comprehensive picture of their financial 
assets and liabilities including the list of guarantees given.  Of course, requirements 
such as presenting compliance costs of various tax proposals have formidable data 
problems with the taxpayers unwilling to disclose the cost such as the amount of 
bribe paid to tax officials.  The NIPFP study in 2002 by Arindam Das-Gupta had to 
rely on a small sample to make the estimates.   Experience has also shown that 
FRBMA can be successful only when the government, not just the Finance Ministry 
has a strong will to embrace fiscal discipline.  Mere passing of the FRBMA and 
presenting the detailed MTFP with all the details recommended does not translate the 
intent into commitment.  Has the government not been presenting the documents on 
outcome budgeting and revenue foregone from various tax exemptions and 
concessions without much effect?  Furthermore, without the involvement of the 
various spending departments in the preparation of MTFP, it will be impossible to 
ensure discipline from them.  How much faith can we repose on the capacity of the 
committee which will evolve into a Fiscal Council to undertake independent review 
and monitoring of the process?  Given that the Council will be appointed by the 
Finance Ministry and will report to it, how independent the review will be and how 
effective will the monitoring process be?  In any case, without the Government’s 
willingness, institutions can not ensure fiscal discipline and it remains to be seen, how 
far the Government will move in this direction.   
 
 
3. Conditionalities for Central and State Governments 
 
 
  An important feature of the 13
th Finance Commission’s recommendations is a 
plethora of conditionalities imposed on both central and state governments.  Ideally, 
the recommendations implementing the reforms should rely on the mechanism of 
incentives to enforce them and specific purpose transfer is the most important 
instrument used.  When properly designed, these can be very effective, particularly in 
altering the spending priorities of the states to ensure minimum standards of services 
in respect of services with significant inter-state spillovers.  In some cases incentives 
should be mixed with penalties in order to make the conditions effective. 
 
Surely, there are economic reasons for giving conditional transfers and 
stipulating conditions is a part of providing incentives to ensure provision of normative 
minimum standards of the specified service. In designing the conditions and 
recommending implementation mechanisms, however, some important factors must 




make the parties comply with the conditions.  Second, it is important to ensure that 
the conditions imposed are within the capacity of the parties to comply.  Third, the 
conditions should be well designed.  It is particularly important to target the conditions 
to ensure that the penalty for failure to comply will be on the non-compliant and not 
others.  Furthermore, the targets should be realistic and when the issue involves 
negotiations and agreements between the centre and states on the one hand and 
among the states inter-se on the other, although it is desirable to set ideal targets, in 
the given environment of political economy, the conditions should be flexible enough 
to accommodate departures from the ideal.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the 13
th Finance Commission has recommended a 
plethora of conditions both to ensure minimum standards of expenditure and to 
incentivise central and state governments to undertake reforms.  Indeed, both 
complying with and enforcing the various conditions is going to be a challenge and 
some states have questioned the conditionalities on the grounds of encroachment in 
their fiscal autonomy.  There are also issues of enforcing conditions when these do 
not involve either ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’.  In fact, the conditions imposed on the centre do 
not involve either incentive payments or penalty.  Furthermore, there is an asymmetry 
in the enforcement of conditions.  In the case of the states, the enforcement will be 
done by the central government whereas for the latter, it is both the player and the 
umpire.  Therefore, it is often said that while the Finance Commissions can only bark 
at the centre, they can bite the states! 
 
Apart from the large number of conditions, there are problems of design and 
implementation.  First, unlike the case of 12
th Finance Commission which 
recommended debt write-off and rescheduling linked to fiscal adjustment, the 13
th 
Finance Commission’s conditions to the states’ fiscal consolidation does not entail 
any incentive payments except in the case of the states which did not pass fiscal 
responsibility legislation as required by the 12
th Finance Commission.  Of course, the 
central government will have the role of enforcing the conditions but can it withhold 
any portion of tax devolution or revenue gap grants for non-compliance?  How can 
the conditions be enforced on the central government?  Second, the revenue loss 
compensation grant recommended by the Commission stipulates that the states will 
have to comply with all the seven components of the “grand bargain”.  The design 
part of the condition requires the states to have the model GST which inter alia 
includes subsuming of a number of state taxes, exemptions to only unprocessed food 
items, public services, education and healthcare and service transactions between an 
employer and an employee.  While the model GST is the goal and the reforms should 
work taking this as a target, it would be unrealistic to expect the states to adopt the 
model GST straight away.  The Commission’s recommendations do not consider 
adoption of any GST structure other than the model GST they have recommended.  
The objective of the recommendation is to incentivise the states to make the 
transition and it must be remembered that any reform, including tax reform is not an 
event but a process.  We may have to do with less than the best, if necessary, and 
the recommendations do not allow for any solution other than what the Commission 
considers to be the best.  This has been a setback for GST reform with the states 
taking varying positions and the central government has had to initiate the process 
again to take the reform forward. 
 
The conditions relating to the local government reform cannot be effective.  
This is because, the grants are targeted to the local bodies but the conditions have to 
be met by the states.  What is the incentive for the states to fulfil the conditions?  Will 








  The Report of the 13
th Finance Commission submitted in December last year 
and placed in the Parliament in the budget session of the Parliament in February has 
not been subject to critical analysis and discussion.  The central government has 
accepted the recommendations relating to transfers and its other recommendations 
have been accepted in principle.  In general, the response to the Finance 
Commission report has been muted and there has hardly been any serious analysis 
or debate except those recommendations relating to the GST on which the states 
have expressed serious concerns.  This paper makes a critical appraisal of the 
recommendations of the Commission, particularly those that relate to the basic task 
of the Commission.  
 
   The  13
th Finance Commission, in its analysis and recommendations has 
dealt with a number of issues that have not been gone into by the previous 
Commissions.  This is partly occasioned by the expanded terms of reference, but to a 
considerable extent this is due to the Commission’s own approach.  Besides tax 
devolution, the Commission has gone on to recommend as many as 12 different 
types of grants with a plethora of conditionalities.  Indeed, the Commission has 
forayed much beyond the task of the Finance Commission. 
 
   The approach of the Commission in regard to the ToRs on tax devolution and 
grants is not different from the past.  The only difference is the taking of per capita 
taxable capacity distance in the place of the per capita income distance as a criterion 
for tax devolution.   Taking taxable capacity in the devolution formula does not take 
away the inequity and perverse incentives arising from the gap filling approach.   
Furthermore, taking average tax-GSDP ratio as a norm to determine taxable capacity 
does not recognise the fact that taxable capacity increases more than proportionately 
as per capita income increases. 
 
  The inability to offset the fiscal disabilities of the states leads to giving several 
grants.  Even here, the approach is ad hoc.  In particular, the grants recommended 
for individual states for their special needs is a classic example of the ad hoc 
approach which is arbitrary and judgemental.   There is no need for such transfer 
once their fiscal disabilities are offset.  The grants recommended for elementary 
education covers only 15 per cent of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan requirements of the 
states.  The understanding is that the rest of the funds should come from the states’ 
own resources.  The previous Commission gave 10 per cent.  The question is why 15 
per cent and why not more or less? 
 
  The recommendations relating to the GST are the ones which have been 
resented most by the states and actually, this has taken the reform agenda 
backwards.  The “all or nothing” types of conditions do not leave much room for a 
“grand bargain”.  It is not surprising that the states have taken different bargaining 
postures and have gone about increasing the general rate of VAT from 12.5 per cent 
to 13.5 per cent.  In fact, the central government has virtually ignored these 
recommendations to continue the dialogue with the states and hopefully, all the 
parties will work towards a consensus to levy the GST in the near future and even if it 
is not the “model GST” recommended by the Commission, it will retain the basic 





  A major concern is the plethora of conditionalities imposed by the 
Commission.  Besides the conditions on GST compensations discussed above, there 
are several conditions stipulated for achieving fiscal consolidation and incentivising 
local bodies.  There are questions of design, implementation, and monitoring of these 
conditions.  Not surprisingly, some states have raised the issue of autonomy.  Can all 
the conditions stipulated be met?  Some of them can be implemented only in the long 
term and it may not be possible for the centre as well as the states to implement 
within the period of recommendation of this Commission.  How can the conditions be 
enforced when there are no incentives?  How do we deal with the issue of conditions 
in respect of local body incentivisation where the conditions are for the state 
governments and if they do not fulfil them, local bodies will lose the grants?  These 
questions leave one suspect that the Commission lost an opportunity to reform the 
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Table 2: Conditionalities Recommended by the Finance Commission 
 Recommend-
ations 
Conditions for Government of India  Conditions for states 
1  Goods and 
Services Tax 
Grand bargain to be concluded. 
 
Grand bargain to be concluded. 
    Elements of the grand bargain are: 
 




Agreement between the centre and 
states with contingencies for changes. 
 
Disincentives for non-compliance. 
 
The implementation schedule. 
 
The procedure for claiming 
compensation. 
 
GST model must be consistent with 









Elements of the grand bargain are 















GST model must be consistent 
with all the elements of the grand 
bargain. 
 
Compensation ceiling of Rs. 50000 
crore to be given to states only when 
they comply with all the elements of 
the grand bargain.  The amount will 
be reduced by Rs. 10000 crore for 
every year of delay.  Unspent 
balance to be distributed to all the 
states according to devolution 
formula. 
If there is no consensus on 
implementation of GST and if it is in 
variance with the recommended 
GST, there will not be any 
compensation. 
2.   Fiscal 
Consolidation 
Fiscal targets to be achieved 
 
Central debt – GDP ratio to be brought 
down from 54.2 per cent in 2009-10 to 
per cent to 44.8 per cent in 2014-15.  
Fiscal deficit to be compressed from 6.8 
per cent to 3 per cent and revenue 
deficit to be reduced from 4.8 per cent 
to a surplus of 0.5 per cent. 
Capital expenditure to be increased 
from 2.1 per cent to 4.5 per cent. 
Disinvestment revenue to be increased 
from 0. per cent to 1 per cent. 
FRBM rules to be changed to put a 
ceiling of 5 per cent of GDP for the 
stock of outstanding liabilities. 
 
Making FRBM transparent 
Annually adjusted medium term fiscal 
framework to set medium term targets 
Fiscal targets to be achieved 
Debt – GDP ratio to be contained at 
25 per cent by 2014-15 from 27 per 
cent in 2007-08. 
 
Long term and permanent target of 
zero revenue deficit.  The states with 
zero revenue deficit and surpluses in 
2007-08 should return to zero 
revenue deficit by 2011-12. They 
should have a fiscal deficit of not 
more than 3 per cent in 2011-12 and 
maintained thereafter. 
 
General category states with 
revenue deficits in 2007-08, Kerala, 
Punjab, and West Bengal should 
return to revenue deficit by 2014-15.  
These states are required to reduce 




consistent with achievement of FRBM 
to provide evidence based rationale for 
deviations in actual out-turns from the 
targets.  
  
Reforms in the budgeting process 
MTFP to be converted into a statement 
of commitment rather than merely one 
of intent.  Annual MTFP statement to be 
converted into a more detailed rolling 
medium term fiscal plan (MTFP) 
containing three year forward estimates 
of revenues and expenditures along 
with a narrative explanation on how the 
estimates are generated.  
 
Reform in the design and 
implementation of fiscal 
responsibility legislation. 
Making FRBM process more 
comprehensive and transparent. 
 
Government should prepare a detailed 
economic and functional classification 
of expenditure budget as a part of 
MTFP from fiscal year 2011-12. 
All central transfers to states to be set 
out in an independent statement.    
Systemisation of tax-expenditure 
estimates with detailed basis of 
estimation reported. 
To report on the compliance cost of 
major tax proposals in the MTFP from 
2013-14. 
All capital expenditure proposals 
included in the central budget should be 
accompanied by a statement of 
revenue consequences of capital 
expenditures for the lifetime of the 
proposed projects.  This should be 
done from 2013-14. 
New policy initiatives that are known to 
involve future expenditure commitments 
should be reflected in the MTFP.  It 
should also provide projections for 
transfers to states in the form of either 
plan assistance or centrally sponsored 
schemes. 
Contingent liabilities to be reported fully 
and adequate provisioning to be made. 
PPP documents should report on the 
details and quantities of financial 
obligations of public sector in PPP.  
These should be collated and stated in 
MTFP. 
Disinvestment receipts should not be 
put in the public account but in the 
consolidated fund. 
Administrative departments as well as 
departmental and non-departmental 
undertakings should prepare a 
complete inventory of vacant land and 
GSDP  by 2014-15. 
 
The five special category 
states,( Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, 
Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and 
Tripura) which had fiscal deficit of 
less than 3 per cent of GSDP should 
maintain their revenue balance and 
achieve the fiscal deficit of 3 per 
cent or less by 2011-12.  To each of 
the remaining six special category 
states with more than 3 per cent of 
GDP during the three years 2005-
08, the Commission gave a separate 
adjustment path to reach the fiscal 
deficit of 3 per cent of GSDP by 
2014-15. 
 
Monitoring and Compliance 
 
The structure of MTFP should be 
more comprehensive giving details 
of significant items under revenue 
and expenditure projections. 
Independent review/monitoring 
should be instituted. 
Revenue consequences of capital 
projects, government liabilities from 
PPP and related arrangements, 
inventory of physical and financial 
assets and vacant public land and 
building should be done by the 
states.  
The states that have not availed the 
benefit of consolidation under 
DCRF, the benefit limited to 
consolidation and interest rate 
reduction to be extended subject to 
their enactment of the FRBM Act.  
Benefits of interest relief on NSSF 
and write off available to the states 
only if they bring about the 
necessary amendment/enactments 
of FRBM.   
      






buildings valued at market prices.  
Consolidated list should be placed in 
the Parliament along with the budget 
documents from fiscal year 2013-14. 
 
Sensitivity to shocks to counter-
cyclical changes 
MTFP should make the values of 
parameters underlying revenue and 
expenditure projections. FRBMA should 
specify the nature of shocks that would 
require relaxation of targets. 
Rather than raising the borrowing limits 
of the states, when the shocks occur, 
the central government should assume 
the entire responsibility and pass on 
resources for spending to the states in 
the form of larger devolution.  
 
 Monitoring and Compliance 
Independent review and monitoring of 
the implementation of FRBM process. 
Committee to be appointed for the 
purpose, which, over time, should 
evolve into a full-fledged Fiscal Council. 
The Council should be an independent 
body reporting to the Finance Ministry, 
which in turn should report to 
Parliament on matters dealt with by the 
Council.  
3.  Local Bodies    
  General basic 
grants 
  States will receive general 
performance grants only if 





  the following nine conditions are 
satisfied 
Supplement to the budget document 
for local bodies.  states should 
require local bodies to maintain 
accounts.  Besides the supplement, 
states should certify that the 
accounting systems as 
recommended have been 
introduced. 
  
States should put in place an audit 
system for all local bodies. C&AG 
should be given technical guidance 
and supervision over audit of al the 
local bodies in the state.  Annual 
Technical Inspection report and 
Annual report of the Director of Local 
Fund Audit must be placed before 
the state legislature. 
 
State governments should put in 
place independent local body 
ombudsmen to look into complaints. 
 
State governments should put in 
place a system to electronically 
transfer the grants provided by the 




to receive it within five days of their 
receipt from the central government.   
In places where there is no banking 
infrastructure, the state government 
should transfer funds through 
alternative channels so as to reach 
the local bodies within 10 days. 
 
State governments must prescribe 
through an Act the qualifications of 
persons eligible for appointment as 
Members of SFC consistent with 
Article 243I (2) of the Constitution. 
  
All local bodies should be fully 
enabled to levy property tax. 
 
State governments must put in place 
a state level Property Tax Board to 
assist all municipal bodies in the 
state an independent and a 
transparent procedure for assessing 
property tax. 
 
State governments must put in place 
standards for delivery of all essential 
services provided by local bodies. 
  
All municipal corporations with a 
population of more than 1 million 
(2001 Census) must put in place a 
fire hazard response and mitigation 
plan for their respective jurisdictions. 




  The state can draw down the 
special area performance grant 
only  if it satisfied with the 
following conditions 
States should indicate in a 
supplement to the budget, details of 
plan and non-plan transfers to local 
bodies under various heads. It 
should specify the agencies that will 
receive the special area basic and 
performance grant and conditions 
under which it is given and the 
procedure for auditing these 
expenditures.    If they are not 
panchayats, they must maintain 
accounts consistent with the 
instruction in force. 
 
The accounts should be audited by 
C&AG and the audit report tabled 
wherever so mandated.  Compliance 
will be demonstrated by the 
certificate from C&AG. 
 
At least district level officials and 
functionaries of these agencies must 
be brought under the ombudsmen.  
Compliance is demonstrated by 







Compliance on transfer of funds 
within the stipulated time would 
require self-certification by state 
governments with the description of 
the arrangements in place.  
 